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NOTE
BANKRUPTCY AND LABOR LAW CONFLICT FROM NLRB V.
BILDISCO & BILDISCO TO THE BANKRUPTCY
AMENDMENTS OF 1984
The issue of collective bargaining agreements received attention from both the
judiciary and Congress in 1984. Yet nearly two years later, the rights of
labor and management are still unclear. Both branches of the federal govern-
ment have attempted to articulate a workable standard permitting reection of
collective bargaining agreements by chapter eleven debtors-in-possession. Re-
jection of collective bargaining agreements may be subject to either the 1984
Supreme Court decision in Bildisco or section 1113 of the Bankruptcy Code.
Those cases filed before July 10, 1984 are governed by Bildisco, and those
after that date are governed by the Bankruptcy Code.
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INTRODUCTION
"Statutory interpretation requires more than concentration upon
isolated words; rather, consideration must be given to the total
corpus of pertinent law and the policies that inspired ostensibly in-
consistent provisions.", For several decades,2 the judiciary at-
tempted to reconcile provisions of the National Labor Relations Act
(NLRA)3 and the Bankruptcy Code.4 The conflict arose when a fi-
1. Boys Markets, Inc. v. Retail Clerks Union, Local 770, 398 U.S. 235, 250
(1970).
2. See infra note 25.
3. 29 U.S.C. §§ 1-1781 (1982).
4. 11 U.S.C. §§ 101-1501 (1982).
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nancially troubled business filed for reorganization under chapter
eleven of the Bankruptcy Code5 and sought permission to reject its
collective bargaining agreement 6 as part of its plan to continue oper-
ations.7 This dilemma appeared with such frequency in the last dec-
ade, 8 that Congress finally addressed the issue.9
Section 365 of the Bankruptcy Code allows a trustee,]() with the
5. See 11 U.S.C. §§ 1101-74. Chapter 11 gives a financially troubled business a
bankruptcy option. The debtor does not have to completely terminate his business.
Instead he may file a plan of reorganization, setting forth proposals for the rehabilita-
tion of the business. A debtor may commence a voluntary case in bankruptcy by
filing a petition under section 301 of the Bankruptcy Code. Id. § 301. Section 109 of
the Code sets out the eligibility requirements for filing a chapter 11 petition. "Only a
person that may be a debtor under chapter 7 of this title, except a stockholder or a
commodity broker, and a railroad may be a debtor under chapter 11 of this title." Id.
§ 109(d). The only "persons" not allowed to be debtors in chapter 7 are railroads,
insurance companies, banks, or similar financial institutions. Id. § 109(b). Section
101 (33) defines person as an "individual, partnership, and corporation, but does not
include a governmental unit .. " Id. § 101(33).
6. See id. § 365(a). Under the Code, an executory contract such as a collective
bargaining agreement is subject to certain exceptions. That section states that "...
the trustee, subject to the court's approval, may assume or reject any executory con-
tract or unexpired lease of the debtor." Id.
7. The presumption in chapter 11 is that the business will be continued. See 11
U.S.C. § 1108.
8. The majority of the cases on this issue, however, arose after 1975. See In re
Brada Miller Freight System Inc., 702 F.2d 890 (11 th Cir. 1983); In re Bildisco, 682
F.2d 72 (3d Cir. 1982), cert. granted sub nom. NLRB v. Bildisco & Bildisco, 103 S. Ct.
784 (1983), aff'd, 104 S. Ct. 1188 (1984) (Justice Brennan dissented from the holding
of no unfair labor practice); Local Joint Executive Bd. v. Hotel Circle, Inc., 613 F.2d
210 (9th Cir. 1980); Brotherhood of Ry. Clerks v. REA Express, Inc., 523 F.2d 164
(2d Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1017 (1975); Shopmen's Local Union No. 455 v.
Kevin Steel Prods., Inc., 519 F.2d 698 (2d Cir. 1975); In re Reserve Roofing Fla., Inc.,
21 Bankr. 96 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1982); In re Southern Elec. Co., 23 Bankr. 348 (Bankr.
E.D. Tenn. 1982).
Cases regarding conflicts between the NLRA and the Bankruptcy Code have had
conflicting results until the Supreme Court decision in Bildisco, 104 S. Ct. 1188.
Professors Bordewieck and Countryman discussed this conflict by stating:
One may properly infer that Congress intended to allow the rejection of
collective bargaining agreements in bankruptcy proceedings arising under
the Code. . . . Notwithstanding this conclusion, it remains true that court-
approved termination of a collective bargaining agreement contravenes fun-
damental labor policy, and that a direct conflict exists between federal bank-
ruptcy and labor laws.
Bordewieck & Countryman, The Rejection of Collective Bargaining Agreements by Chapter II
Debtors, 57 AM. BANKR. LJ. 293, 300 (1983).
9. Bankruptcy Amendments and Federal Judgeship Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-
353, Title 1113 Subtitle J, § 541(a), 98 Stat. 390 (11 U.S.C.A. § 1113 (West Supp.
1984)).
10. In a chapter 11 case, the court has the choice of either allowing the debtor to
remain in control or appointing a trustee. See 11 U.S.C. § 1104. The court will ap-
point a trustee if: (1) there is cause, such as fraud or mismanagement by the debtor;
or (2) appointment is in the interests of the creditors or any other interested party.
[Vol. 12
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court's permission, to reject executory contracts.' I Section 8(d) of
the NLRA, however, prohibits unilateral modification or termination
of a collective bargaining agreement.' 2 The question became
whether the bankruptcy procedure allowed rejection of an executory
labor contract or whether the NLRA prohibited such termination. In
February of 1984, the United States Supreme Court apparently set-
tled the issue in NLRB v. Bildisco & Bildisco, 13 by holding that the
contract could be rejected. 14
A month later, however, Congress offered its own solution to the
conflict by introducing an amendment to the Bankruptcy Code.15
The original amendment directly reversed the Supreme Court's deci-
sion. 16 After three months, Congress adopted section 1113 of the
Bankruptcy Code. 17 The amendment established the procedures for
rejection of a collective bargaining agreement by a trustee or debtor-
in-possession. 18
This Note is an analysis of the accommodation of federal labor and
bankruptcy laws by the Bankruptcy Amendment and Federal Judge-
ship Act of 1984. To provide the background for the congressional
action, the Bildisco decision will be reviewed. The requirements and
standards of section 1113 are then examined. This Note continues
by analyzing the practical application of section 1113. Finally, this
Note suggests appropriate application of section 1113 by the bank-
ruptcy courts.
I. JUDICIAL SOLUTION TO THE CONFLICT: BILDISCO
The Bildisco decision was intended to answer the questions regard-
ing rejection of a collective bargaining agreement by a debtor in pos-
session. The Court addressed three issues. First, the Court held that
Id.; see also H.R. REP. No. 595, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 220, 221, reprinted in 1978 U.S.
CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 5963, 6180. The presumption is that the debtor will remain
in possession and manage the business unless the court finds the parties in interest
would be better served by a trustee. Id.
11. 11 U.S.C. § 365.
12. 29 U.S.C. § 158(d) (1982). See infra notes 117-22 and accompanying text.
13. 104 S. Ct. 1188 (1984).
14. Id. at 1196. The Court stated that the Bankruptcy Code permits rejection of
all executory contracts with some exceptions. Id. at 1196. The Court also found that
it was not disputed that the parties' unexpired collective bargaining agreement was
an executory contract. Id. at 1194.
15. H.R. 5174, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. § 541, 130 CONG. REC. H1842 (daily ed.
Mar. 21, 1984).
16. See id. The amendment as originally proposed required that a debtor show
that it would be forced into liquidation if not permitted to reject the labor contract.
See also infra notes 50-51 and accompanying text.
17. H.R. 5174, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. § 541, 130 CONG. REC. H7488 (daily ed.
June 29, 1984).
18. See infra notes 77-103 and accompanying text.
1986]
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a debtor-in-possession has the power to reject a collective bargaining
agreement. Second, the Court articulated a standard for bankruptcy
courts to follow in determining whether rejection is warranted.
Third, the Court addressed the issue of when the debtor-in-posses-
sion is allowed to reject the contract.
A. Power to Reject Executory Labor Contracts
The rationale for granting a debtor-in-possession the power to re-
ject a collective bargaining agreement evolved from a literal reading
of the Bankruptcy Code, to a more modern view that a debtor-in-
possession is a new entity. Earlier cases treated labor contracts as
any other executory contract.' 9 It was not until the early 1960's that
courts began to view rejection of collective bargaining agreements in
light of labor laws.20
Section 365 of the Bankruptcy Code gives a trustee the power,
with the bankruptcy court's permission, to reject executory con-
tracts. 2' The debtor-in-possession is given these same rights in a
chapter eleven reorganization.22 The Code does not define execu-
tory,23 but the term commonly refers to contracts in "which the obli-
gation of both the bankrupt and the other party to the contract are so
far unperformed that the failure of either to complete performance
would constitute a material breach excusing the performance of the
other." 2 4 Courts have had little or no problem finding collective
bargaining agreements to be executory.2 5 It follows, therefore, that
19. See generally Chamberlain, Collective Bargaining and the Concept of Contract, 48
COLUM. L. REV. 829, 833 (1948); Countryman, Executory Contracts in Bankruptcy: Part II,
58 MINN. L. REV. 479 (1974) (article dealing with rejection of executory contracts,
including collective bargaining agreements). But see Note, The Accommodation of the
Bankruptcy and Labor Acts in Chapter 11 Reorganizations, 16 CREIGHTON L. REV. 859, 860-
61 (1983) (reference to labor contracts as a generalized code); Note, Bankruptc' and
the Rejection of Collective Bargaining Agreements, 51 NOTRE DAME LAw. 819, 825 (1976)
(lack of voluntariness in collective bargaining takes it out of the scope of a consensual
agreement).
20. See, e.g., In re Overseas Nat'l Airways, Inc., 238 F. Supp. 359 (E.D.N.Y. 1965)
(recognition that interests of labor must be recognized in rejection of collective bar-
gaining agreement).
21. 11 U.S.C. § 365(a); see supra note 6.
22. 11 U.S.C. § 1107. The only right denied the debtor-in-possession is the right
to compensation. Id.
23. See S. REP. No. 989, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 58, reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEws 5787, 5844. "Though there is no precise definition of what con-
tracts are executory, it generally includes contracts on which performance remains
due to some extent on both sides." Id.
24. Countryman, Executory Contracts in Bankruptcy: Part 1, 57 MINN. L. REV. 439,
460 (1973).
25. The courts began considering labor contracts as executory in the late 1950's.
See In re Klaber Bros., 173 F. Supp. 83 (S.D.N.Y. 1959). The Klaber court perceived
no difference between commercial contracts and those entered into under the NLRA.
[Vol. 12
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a collective bargaining agreement could likewise be rejected.
Over the years, however, courts realized that the rejection of col-
lective bargaining agreements may be contrary to labor laws. Sec-
tion 8(d) of the NLRA prohibits the unilateral termination of labor
contracts. 26 To avoid the restriction of section 8(d), the "new en-
tity" theory27 was created. Under this theory, courts have held that a
debtor could reject its labor contract because it was not the same
entity that existed before bankruptcy.28 The Supreme Court, how-
Id. at 85. The court also stated that the NLRB had no jurisdiction over executory
contracts in bankruptcy cases. Id.
In the mid-1960's, a federal district court, although disallowing rejection, sug-
gested in dicta that executory contracts encompass collective bargaining agreements
as commercial contracts. In re Overseas Nat'l Airways, Inc., 238 F. Supp. 359, 361
(E.D.N.Y. 1965).
By the late 1960's, another district court affirmatively stated, "[n]either the labor
legislation of the Congress nor the Bankruptcy Act contains any language which
would generally exclude collective bargaining agreements" from the scope of execu-
tory contracts. Carpenters Local Union No. 2746 v. Turney Wood Prods., Inc., 289
F. Supp. 143, 149 (W.D. Ark. 1968).
26. 29 U.S.C. § 158(d). The section, however, provides for termination when
certain conditions are met.
27. See, e.g., Kevin Steel, 519 F.2d at 704.
28. The new entity theory classified the debtor as a new company "with its own
rights and duties." Id. at 704; see REA Express, 523 F.2d at 170. A debtor-in-posses-
sion is not considered to be the same entity as the "pre-bankruptcy company." This
new entity must comply with labor laws, however, it is generally not bound by the
labor agreements of the pre-bankruptcy company. Kevin Steel, 519 F.2d at 704.
As a corollary to the issue of permission to reject, there is also a requirement
that the debtor-in-possession have permission to assume an executory contract. The
Bankruptcy Code provides that a "trustee [or debtor-in-possession], subject to the
court's approval, may assume or reject any executory contract.... ." 11 U.S.C.
§ 365(a). If the debtor is a new entity, it is difficult to imagine why it needs permis-
sion to assume a contract to which it was not a party. Also, it would appear unneces-
sary to reject a contract to which it was never a party.
If the debtor is a new entity, it is more like a successor employer which takes over
after the sale of the business. See REA Express, 523 F.2d at 170; Kevin Steel, 519 F.2d at
704. Successor employers have infrequently been held to their predecessor's collec-
tive bargaining agreements. See, e.g., NLRB v. Burns Int'l Sec. Servs., Inc., 406 U.S.
272 (1972). In Burns, the successor employer was not bound to an existing collective
bargaining agreement because it was not a party to the agreement. Id. at 281-82.
The policy argument is that to maintain the flow of capital, successor employers must
be allowed to enter into their own contracts. The court implied that few businesses
would buy an existing business if they were forced to assume its contracts. Id. at 287-
88; see also Howard Johnson Co. v. Detroit Local Joint Executive Bd., 417 U.S. 249
(1974) (franchisor not held to contract of franchisee). But seeJohn Wiley & Sons, Inc.
v. Livingston, 376 U.S. 543 (1964) (successor employer held to arbitration clause).
Since a labor contract often fails to bind a successor employer, it would be unjust to
bind the debtor-in-possession. See Bordewieck & Countryman, supra note 8, at 304-
14.
Three cases have established the standard for determining whether successor
employers could be held to pre-existing labor contracts. The standard the Court
uses to allow rejection by a successor appears to rely on the continuity of the busi-
19861
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ever, rejected this theory.
In Bildisco, the Supreme Court held that a collective bargaining
agreement is an executory contract that may be rejected under sec-
tion 365 of the Bankruptcy Code.29 The Court dismissed the new
entity theory as legal fiction.30 Relying heavily on congressional in-
tent, the Court determined that the power to reject a collective bar-
gaining agreement was derived directly from the Bankruptcy Code.31
When Congress enacted the Bankruptcy Code, it knew that there was
a perceived conflict between bankruptcy and labor laws.32 Congress,
however, provided no special treatment for collective bargaining
agreements. 33 Therefore, according to the Bildisco Court, collective
ness. See Howard Johnson, 417 U.S. at 264-66; Burns, 406 U.S. at 288-89;John Wiley &
Sons, 376 U.S. at 548. Nowhere does there seem to be more continuity than between
a failing business and that same business operated by a debtor-in-possession.
Bordewieck & Countryman, supra note 8, at 305. See generally Note, The Bargaining
Obligations of Successor Employers, 88 HARV. L. REV. 759 (1975) (outlining advantages
and disadvantages of imposing existing collective bargaining agreements upon suc-
cessor employers).
29. Bildisco, 104 S. Ct. at 1194-97. "Any inference that collective bargaining
agreements are not included within the general scope of § 365(a) because they differ
for some purposes from ordinary contracts. . . is rebutted by the statutory design of
§ 365(a) and by the language of § 1167 of the Bankruptcy Code." Id. at 1194 (cita-
tion omitted).
Section 365 limits the power of the debtor-in-possession by disallowing rejection
or assumption of certain types of executory contracts. In essence, the limitations are:
(1) no assumption is allowed if there has been a default; (2) no assumption or assign-
ment is allowed if the creditor is excused by law from accepting assumption or does
not consent to assumption; (3) the trustee must assume or reject within 60 days after
filing, but in chapter 11 cases the assumption or rejection may take place any time
prior to confirmation of the plan; and (4) the contract cannot be rejected or modified
solely because of a contract provision regarding bankruptcy proceedings. 11 U.S.C.
§ 365(a)-(e).
Section 1167 of the Bankruptcy Code provides that the collective bargaining
agreement of employees subject to the Railway Labor Act (RLA) may not be rejected
or modified by the trustee or the court without following the procedures outlined in
section 45 of the RLA. See 11 U.S.C. § 1167. The Supreme Court has concluded that
because Congress "knew how to draft an exclusion for collective bargaining agree-
ments when it wanted to," it would have done so for labor contracts if that were its
intention. Bildisco, 104 S. Ct. at 1195.
In a concurring and dissenting opinion, Justice Brennan agreed that the test set
out "properly accommodates" the Bankruptcy Code and NLRA, but argued that
more emphasis should have been given to labor policies. Id. at 1201 (Brennan, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part).
30. See Bildisco, 104 S. Ct. at 1197.
31. See id. at 1194.
32. Id. at 1194-95; Comment, The Collective Bargaining Agreement in Bankruptcv: Re-
jection and its Consequences, 36 ARK. L. REV. 469 (1983) (discussing the conflict between
the two federal statutory schemes).
33. 104 S. Ct. at 1195. The Code is not completely silent on the subject of col-
lective bargaining agreements. Section 1167 of the Code provides an exemption for
[Vol. 12
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bargaining agreements must be capable of rejection.34
Lack of statutory exemption was only one factor in the power to
reject collective bargaining agreements. In Bildisco, the Court rea-
soned that rejection furthers the purpose of reorganization under
the Code.35 Reorganization allows a debtor to continue in opera-
labor agreements governed by the Railway Labor Act (RLA). 11 U.S.C. § 1167. Sec-
tion 1167 provides:
Notwithstanding section 365 of this title, neither the court nor the
trustee may change the wages or working conditions of employees of the
debtor established by a collective bargaining agreement that is subject to the
Railway Labor Act (45 U.S.C. 151 et seq.) except in accordance with section 6
of such Act (45 U.S.C. 156).
Id.
The RLA provides that changes in labor contracts may not be made without
prior notice and agreement by both parties. See 45 U.S.C. § 156. The recognized
importance of carrier labor laws is "too delicate and has too long a history for this
code to upset established relationships." H.R. REP. No. 595, 95th Cong., 2d Sess.
423 (1978), reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 5963, 6379.
34. 104 S. Ct. at 1196. The Third Circuit found that Congress was well aware of
the fact that debtors had been rejecting collective bargaining agreements. See Bildisco,
682 F.2d at 78.
When addressing the issue of a standard of rejection, the Supreme Court men-
tioned the "canon of statutory construction that Congress is presumed to be aware of
judicial interpretations of a statute .... ." Bildisco, 104 S. Ct. at 1195. The same
analysis can be applied to collective bargaining agreements. Since Congress made
no mention of a ban on rejection of collective bargaining agreements, Congress must
have intended them to be included in executory contracts. See also In re Ateco Equip.,
Inc., 18 Bankr. 915 (Bankr. W.D. Pa. 1982) (concluding that Congress did not intend
special treatment for collective bargaining under the Bankruptcy Code).
The Supreme Court stated that since Congress knew how to give deference to
RLA contracts, it would have done so for NLRA contracts if that were the intent.
Bildisco, 104 S. Ct. at 1194-95; cf Kevin Steel, 519 F.2d at 702.
35. See 104 S. Ct. at 1197; H.R. REP. No. 595, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 220, reprinted
in 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS at 6179.
The purpose of a business reorganization case, unlike a liquidation case, is
to restructure a business's finances so that it may continue to operate, pro-
vide its employees with jobs, pay its creditors, and produce a return for its
stockholders. The premise of a business reorganization is that assets that
are used for production in the industry for which they were designed are
more valuable than those same assets sold for scrap.
Id.
The basic aim in allowing rejection of executory contracts is: (1) to relieve the
debtor from burdensome contracts; and (2) to sustain for the debtor the benefits of
worthwhile contracts while assuring the other party against continued or future de-
fault of the debtor. See P. MURPHY, CREDITORS RIGHTS IN BANKRUPTCY § 9.01 (1980);
see also Levy & Blum, Limitations on Rejection of Lnion Contracts Under the Bankruptc, Act,
83 COM. L.J. 259, 261 (1978).
In REA Express, the court took judicial notice of the fact that "[iut is a rare case
when the financial distress of an enterprise in bankruptcy does not work a hardship
on its creditors, including those who render services to the debtor." 523 F.2d at 169.
In such circumstances, the employees and the union should not "be permitted to
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tion, keep employees employed, and give creditors a better chance
for repayment than they would have if the debtor was forced into
liquidation.36 The rejection of certain executory contracts furthers
this purpose by releasing a debtor's estate from burdensome obliga-
tions that can impede a successful reorganization.37 The task for the
bankruptcy court is to determine when a collective bargaining agree-
ment could pose such a threat to the estate.
B. Standards of Rejection
The Supreme Court held that a collective bargaining agreement
could be rejected if the agreement is burdensome and the equities
balance in favor of rejection.38 The Court placed the burden on the
debtor to show that the contract should be rejected.39 The develop-
ment of the Supreme Court standard is based on three circuit court
decisions: Shopmen's Local Union No. 455 v. Kevin Steel Products, Inc.;
40
Brotherhood of Railway, Airline & Steamship Clerks v. REA Express, Inc.;
41
and NLRB v. Bildisco & Bildisco.42 These decisions also serve as the
36. See generally P. MURPHY, supra note 35, § 16.01 (reorganization plans); Levy &
Blum, supra note 35, at 260 (goal is rehabilitation of the business); Pulliam, The Rejec-
tion of Collective Bargaining Agreements Under Section 365 of the Bankruptcy Code, 58 AM.
BANKR. L.J. 1 (1984) (detailed discussion of the history and purpose of reorganization
and role of rejection of collective bargaining agreements).
37. In Bildisco, the Third Circuit stated that statistics show that a successful reor-
ganization are as beneficial to creditors as for debtors.
According to tabulations taken from a sample of bankruptcy cases, priority
creditors usually received full payment in a successful reorganization but
realized less than one-third of the amount of their claims in a straight bank-
ruptcy. Unsecured creditors realized only a median nineteen percent under
one-payment plans and ten percent under deferred payment plans when the
debtor went through reorganization, but in straight bankruptcies the me-
dian was only eight percent.
Bildisco, 682 F.2d at 77 n.6 (citing D. STANLEY & M. GIRTH, BANKRUPTCY: PROBLEM,
PROCESS, REFORM 129-30, 142-43 (1971)).
38. Bildisco, 104 S. Ct. at 1196. The Court stated that a bankruptcy court should
not allow rejection of a collective bargaining agreement unless it would further the
purpose of bankruptcy. Id.
39. See id. at 1196-97.
40. 519 F.2d 698 (2d Cir. 1975). The Second Circuit held that a court could
permit a debtor-in-possession to reject an executory labor contract only after thor-
ough scrutiny and a careful balancing of the equities on both sides. Id. at 706.
41. 523 F.2d 164 (2d Cir. 1975). One month later, the Second Circuit held that:
[Wihere, after careful weighing of all the factors and equities involved, in-
cluding interests sought to be protected by the [Railway Labor Act], a dis-
trict court concludes that an onerous and burdensome executory collective
bargaining agreement will thwart efforts to save a failing carrier in bank-
ruptcy from collapse, the court may under § 313(1) authorize rejection or
disaffirmance of the agreement.
Id. at 169.
42. 682 F.2d 72 (3d Cir. 1982). The Bildisco court adopted the balancing test of
Kevin Steel but rejected the cases subsequently interpreting Kevin Steel. Id. at 79-80.
The court set out two reasons for its rejection of the REA Express standard:
[Vol. 12
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basis for the subsequent bankruptcy amendments.43
In Kevin Steel, the Second Circuit found that a court could permit a
debtor-in-possession to reject an executory labor contract only after
thorough scrutiny and after carefully balancing the equities on both
sides. 4 4 The Second Circuit subsequently set forth a stricter stan-
dard in REA Express.4 5 The REA Express court held that collective
bargaining agreements must be "onerous and burdensome," and the
court will not reject a collective bargaining agreement unless it will
prevent successful reorganization.46 Finally, the Third Circuit, in
Bildisco, adopted the balancing test of Kevin Steel and rejected the
REA Express standard. 47 On appeal, the Supreme Court adopted the
[Flirst, for the pragmatic reason that it may be impossible to predict the
success vel non of a reorganization until very late into the arrangement pro-
ceedings; and second, for the prudential consideration that the imposition
of such a test unduly exalts the perpetuation of the collective bargaining
agreement over the more pragmatic consideration of whether the employ-
ees will continue to have jobs at all.
Id. at 80; see also Local Unions v. Brada Miller Freight Sys., Inc., (In re Brada Miller
Freight Sys., Inc.), 702 F.2d 890, 899 (11 th Cir. 1983) (agreeing with Bildisco that
REA Express test too burdensome to debtor-in-possession); In re Southern Elec. Co., 23
Bankr. 348, 356-58 (Bankr. E.D. Tenn. 1982) (discussing Kevin Steel and REA Express);
In re Reserve Roofing Fla. Inc., 21 Bankr. 96, 100 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1982) (comparing
Kevin Steel and REA Express). See generally Note, Collective Bargaining Agreements and the
Bankruptcy Reform Act: 'hat Test Should the Bankruptcy, Court Use in Deciding Whether to
Allow a Debtor to Reject a Collective Bargaining Agreement?, 51 U. CIN. L. REV. 862 (1982)
(collective bargaining agreement not ordinary contract and mandates stricter
standard).
43. See in/ra notes 102-11 and accompanying text.
44. 519 F.2d at 706. The court's decision is based on the policies of the Bank-
ruptcy Act and the NLRA. The bankruptcy law is meant "to preserve the funds of the
debtor for distribution to creditors and to give the debtor a new start, while the basic
policy of the labor law is always to encourage creation and enforcement of collective
bargaining agreements." Id. at 706 (quoting Comment, Collective Bargaining and Bank-
riiptcy, 42 S. CAL. L. REV. 477, 477 (1969).
45. 523 F.2d at 169. The court applied two contradictory statutes. First, the case
involved a contract of airline employees. While airline employees were not contem-
plated when the RLA was promulgated, and therefore not specifically included, they
have been drawn under its protection. The purpose of the RLA is to "avoid disrup-
tion of commerce by insuring that the can-ier will continue operations pending reso-
lution of labor disputes." Id. Second, § 77 of the old Bankruptcy Act prohibited
unilateral rejection of contracts subject to the RLA. 11 U.S.C. § 205(n) (1976) (re-
pealed in 1978). The REA E.xpress court found that prohibiting rejection would hin-
der the purpose of the RLA because the end result could well be to preclude financial
reorganization of the carrier and thus lead to its demise. REA Express, 523 F.2d at
169.
46. REA Express, 523 F.2d at 169.
47. Kevin Steel, 682 F.2d at 79-80. The court specifically stated that it was re-
jecting the REA Express standard. Id. The court found that it is unrealistic to expect
that a bankruptcy court will know at the time of petition whether reorganization will
fail absent rejection of the contract. Id. at 80.
Bildisco filed for bankruptcy in April of 1980. Id. at 75. Two years later it was
still uncertain whether the plan would be successful. Id. at 80. The court also stated
1986]
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Third Circuit standard.48
The Court held that if the contract is burdensome and the equities
balance in favor of rejection, the debtor should be allowed to reject
the agreement. 49 The Court refused to require the debtor to
demonstrate it would be forced into liquidation if not permitted to
reject the collective bargaining agreement. 50 The Supreme Court
reasoned that the evidentiary burden would be difficult, if not impos-
sible, for a debtor to meet.5' Requiring the debtor to meet such a
burden would frustrate the equitable nature of the bankruptcy
proceeding.52
In an attempt to protect the policies of the NLRA,53 the Court
that the stricter test could harm the workers. Id. If the debtor is unable to meet the
requirements of the REA Express standard and is forced into liquidation, the employ-
ees lose their jobs completely.
Bankruptcy courts should consider the impact of a strike on the debtor. Id. A
strike could very easily push the debtor over the line into liquidation. Id. The bank-
ruptcy court should also consider the possibility of a breach of a contract claim by the
employees, the impact such a claim would have on the company, and the adequacy of
relief the employees may receive through the claim. Id.
The standard is somewhat ambiguous. The court could be implying that a large
union contract would be so burdensome on the debtor that rejection should be al-
lowed. On the other hand, a greater number of employees would be affected, which
is an argument against rejection.
48. Bildisco, 104 S. Ct. at 1196.
49. See id.
50. Id. The Court considered the Board's argument that the REA Express stan-
dard was adopted by Congress when it reformed the Bankruptcy Act. The REA Ex-
press decision was in 1975. The Bankruptcy Act was reformed in 1977 to the present
Code. See id. at 1194. Therefore, the Board argued, Congress approved the stan-
dard. Id. at 1195-96.
Additionally, the Board argued there is evidence in the legislative history indicat-
ing that the REA Express standard was adopted. The legislative history of the Code
mentions both REA Express and Kevin Steel in its discussion of a stricter standard for
collective bargaining agreements in municipal bankruptcy. See id. at 1196.
The Supreme Court correctly points out that the history refers to both cases.
Those standards are markedly different. The Court was unwilling to infer a prefer-
ence for one standard over the other. Id. at 1196.
The Court refused to affirm a requirement that the debtor must prove that it
would be forced into liquidation if it was not permitted to reject the collective bar-
gaining agreement. Id. at 1196. Bankruptcy proceedings are equitable and should
be flexible, according to the Court. Id.
51. Id. The Court reiterated the Third Circuit argument that the evidentiary bur-
den may be too difficult for the debtor. See supra note 47.
52. See Bildisco, 104 S. Ct. at 1197. "The Bankruptcy Court is a court of equity
• . . moreover it must have great latitude to consider any type of evidence .... ." Id.
53. The purpose of labor-management relations under the NLRA is to:
[P]romote the full flow of commerce, to proscribe the legitimate rights of
both employees and employers in their relations affecting commerce, to
provide orderly and peaceful procedures for preventing the interference by
either with the legitimate rights of the other, to protect the rights of individ-
ual employees in their relations with labor organizations whose activities af-
[Vol. 12
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required the debtor to negotiate with the union representative.54
The Court did not hold that permission to reject the contract was
dependent on negotiation. 5 5 The Court stated that good faith bar-
gaining was a factor for the bankruptcy court to consider.56 If nego-
tiation did not solve the problem, the bankruptcy court could step in
on behalf of the debtor.5
7
C. Rejection is Not an Unfair Labor Practice
The most controversial part of the Bildisco decision is the Court's
holding that a debtor does not commit an unfair labor practice by
terminating the contract before permission is granted by the bank-
ruptcy court. 58 The rejection of the agreement before court ap-
proval is contrary to both the NLRA and the Bankruptcy Code.59
The Supreme Court held, however, that the purposes of bankruptcy
would be better served by allowing the debtor to abrogate the con-
tract when the debtor found it necessary to save its business.60
The policy reason allowing rejection of a collective bargaining
agreement is to assist the debtor-in-possession in its attempt to revi-
fect commerce, to define and proscribe practices on the part of labor and
management which affect commerce and are inimical to the general welfare,
and to protect the rights of the public in connection with labor disputes
affecting commerce.
29 U.S.C. § 141.
54. Bildisco, 104 S. Ct. at 1196. Section 8(a)(5) of the Act imposes on the parties
to a collective bargaining agreement a duty to bargain in good faith. 29 U.S.C.
§ 158(a)(5). Compliance with this duty demonstrates that attempts have been made
to protect the rights of employees. See Bildisco, 104 S. Ct. at 1196-97. If negotiation
fails to solve the problem, the bankruptcy court may step in on behalf of the debtor.
See id. at 1197.
55. Bildisco, 104 S. Ct. at 1197.
56. Id. at 1200.
57. Id. In order for a bankruptcy court to intervene, however, the bargaining
process need not have reached an impasse. Impasse is a term of art in labor law and
there are no tests to determine when it occurs. Impasse has been equated with reach-
ing a "stalemate." See NLRB v. Almeida Bus Lines, Inc., 333 F.2d 729, 731 (1st Cir.
1964). To ask that a bankruptcy court wait until an impasse occurs means that the
court would have to make a determination in an area which bankruptcy courts have
little or no expertise. See Bildisco, 104 S. Ct. at 1200.
Whether impasse has been reached generally is a judgment call for the
Board to make; imposing such a requirement as a condition precedent to
rejection of the labor contract will simply divert the Bankruptcy Court from
its customary area of expertise into a field in which it presumably has little
or none.
Id.
58. See Bildisco, 104 S. Ct. at 1197. The unfair labor practice alleged was a viola-
tion of § 8(d) of the NLRA. 29 U.S.C.A. § 158(d).
59. See 11 U.S.C. § 365; 29 U.S.C. § 158(d).
60. See Bildisco, 104 S. Ct. at 1197-98. The Court reasons that enforcing the col-
lective bargaining agreement may discourage creditors from "infus[ing] the ailing
form with additional capital." Id.
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talize its business. 6' Permitting the debtor to reject its collective bar-
gaining agreement before it receives permission from the bankruptcy
court furthers this policy.62 It shields the debtor from action by the
National Labor Relations Board (NLRB).
Section 8(d) of the NLRA provides that neither party to a collec-
tive bargaining agreement may unilaterally modify or terminate the
agreement without following specified procedures.63 The parties
must comply with procedures mandating notification and media-
tion.64 If these procedures are not followed, the NLRB may issue a
cease-and-desist order directing the debtor to assume the contract. 65
The Bildisco holding, however, prohibits such an order in bankruptcy
cases.
6 6
The Court's dismissal of an unfair labor practice is based on the
application of bankruptcy procedure.67 Section 3 6 5(g) of the Bank-
ruptcy Code provides that a rejection of an executory contract con-
61. The policy is well-recognized by the courts and legislature. See Bildisco, 682
F.2d at 81; REA Express, 523 F.2d at 170-71; Kevin Steel, 519 F.2d at 706; H.R. REP.
No. 595, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 220, reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS
5963, 6179. See generally Comment, supra note 33, at 470 ("[Tlhe debtor needs fast
and efficient way to reduce operating expenses which require large outlays of cash.").
62. See Bildisco, 104 S. Ct. at 1197-98.
63. Section 8(d) provides that parties seeking termination or modification of a
collective bargaining agreement must:
(1) serve[ ] a written notice upon the other party to the contract of the pro-
posed termination or modification sixty days prior to the expiration date
thereof, or . . . sixty days prior to proposed termination or modification;
(2) offer[ ] to meet and confer with the other party for the purpose of nego-
tiating a new contract or a contract containing the proposed modification;
(3) notifly] the Federal Mediation and Conciliation Service within thirty days
after such notice of the existence of a dispute, and simultaneously therewith
notifly] any State or Territorial agency established to mediate and conciliate
disputes within the State or Territory where the dispute occurred, provided
no agreement has been reached by that time; and (4) continue in full force
and effect, without resorting to strike or lock-out, all the terms and condi-
tions of the existing contract for a period of sixty days after such notice is
given or until the expiration date of such contract, whichever occurs later.
29 U.S.C. § 158(d).
The NLRB argued that because Bildisco failed to uphold the terms of the ex-
isting agreement before the bankruptcy court granted permission to reject, it was a
violation of § 8(d). Bildisco, 104 S. Ct. at 1198.
64. See 29 U.S.C. § 158(d). Justice Brennan's dissent in Bildisco points out that
the notice and "cooling off" requirements serve to prevent the economic warfare that
can result from unilateral changes in collective bargaining agreements. 104 S. Ct. at
1208. There is nothing in the statute which provides exemption from these proce-
dural requirements. See 29 U.S.C. § 158(d).
65. 29 U.S.C. § 160(c).
66. See 104 S. Ct. at 1199 (enforcement of the cease and desist order runs
counter to the express provisions of the Bankruptcy Code).
67. See id. at 1197-99. The Court began its analysis by dismissing the argument
that the debtor is not held to § 8(d) because it is a "new entity." The argument is
that if the debtor is a new entity it is not a party to the collective bargaining agree-
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stitutes a breach of the contract.68 A breach relates back to the day
prior to filing of the petition.69 Claims for a breach of a contract
against a debtor's estate are settled through bankruptcy admininstra-
tive procedures. 70 If the NLRB were to order the debtor to cease
and desist, the Board would be circumventing bankruptcy
procedure.
In Bildisco, the Court also held that an unfair labor practice would
be contrary to the purpose of bankruptcy reorganization.71 If a
debtor had to wait for permission to reject the contract, then the
debtor might be forced into liquidation.72 A debtor has until accept-
ance of a reorganization plan to reject or assume any of its executory
contracts. 73 If a debtor, through a NLRB order, were forced to as-
sume the contract, the debtor's business will fail.74 Thus, due to the
flexible nature of the reorganization process, a debtor should be al-
lowed to reject when necessary without interference from labor
laws.75
ment. If the debtor were not a party to the agreement, it would not be bound by the
rules set out in § 8(d). See id. at 1197.
68. 11 U.S.C. § 365(g).
[T]he rejection of an executory contract or unexpired lease of the debtor
constitutes a breach of such contract or lease-
(1) if such contract or lease has not been assumed under this section or
under a plan confirmed under chapter 9, 11, or 13 of this title, immediately
before the date of the filing of the petition ....
Id. § 365(g)(1). The articulated purpose is to "treat rejection claims as pre-petition
claims." S. REP. No. 989, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 60, reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE CONG.
& AD. NEws 5787, 5846.
69. See 11 U.S.C. § 365(g)(1).
70. These administrative procedures are set forth in 11 U.S.C. § 502(g).
71. 104 S. Ct. at 1199.
72. In reorganization, the debtor-in-possession has until a plan is filed to accept
or reject its executory contracts. 11 U.S.C. § 365(d)(2). The plan of reorganization
may take months or years. The debtor has a lengthy procedure to follow before a
plan is adopted. First, there is a period of disclosure required. Id. § 1125. Second,
any party in interest may accept or reject the plan. Id. § 1126. This is predictably
time-consuming. Third, there must be a confirmation hearing at which any party in
interest may still object to the plan before it can be adopted. Id. § 1128. See generally
Comment, supra note 32, at 470-71 (labor procedures are so lengthy that an existing
contract would be a drain on the cash reserves).
73. 11 U.S.C. § 365(d)(2).
74. See 104 S. Ct. at 1199.
75. A number of issues have arisen in the context of unfair labor practices by a
debtor-in-possession or the trustee of the debtor's estate. See Nathanson v. NLRB,
344 U.S. 25 (1952) (NLRB order to pay back wages); Yorke v. NLRB, 709 F.2d 1138,
1144 (7th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 1276 (1984) (failure to bargain in good
faith); Mansfield Tire & Rubber Co. v. Ohio, 660 F.2d 1108 (6th Cir. 1981) (violation
of workers' compensation laws); NLRB v. Evans Plumbing Co., 639 F.2d 291, 292
(5th Cir. 1981) (reinstatement and backpay for wrongful discharge); In re Shippers
Interstate Serv., Inc., 618 F.2d 9, 13 (7th Cir. 1980) (filing of chapter 11 petition does
not operate as automatic stay of NLRB unfair labor practice proceedings); Local Joint
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II. LEGISLATIVE SOLUTION TO THE CONFLICT: SECTION 1113
Five months after the Bildisco decision, Congress provided for re-
jection of collective bargaining agreements in the Bankruptcy Code.
Section 1113 was added to the Code by the Bankruptcy Amendments
and Federal Judgeship Act of 1984.76 The amendment established
the procedures to be followed and the standard to be used in re-
jecting a collective bargaining agreement.
A. Procedure for Reecting a Collective Bargaining Agreement
The only method for a debtor-in-possession to reject a collective
bargaining agreement is the one provided in section 1113. 77 The
procedures are triggered after filing a petition in bankruptcy. 78 In
addition, the debtor must show the court that these procedures were
complied with before it sought permission to reject the contract. 7'9
The essence of the statute is that the debtor must negotiate with
the union's representative. The debtor must make a proposal to the
union outlining modifications in the collective bargaining agree-
ment.8 0 Only those changes that are "necessary" to successful reor-
Executive Bd. v. Hotel Circle, Inc., 613 F.2d 210, 216 (9th Cir. 1980) (receiver with-
out authority to affirm collective bargaining agreement); NLRB v. Jonas (In re Bel Air
Chateau Hosp., Inc.), 611 F.2d 1248, 1250-51 (9th Cir. 1979) (regulatory proceed-
ings of NLRB not subject to automatic stay provisions of Bankruptcy Act); NLRB v.
Bachelder, 120 F.2d 574, 577-78 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 314 U.S. 647 (1941) (refusal
to bargain); Borman's Inc. v. Allied Supermarkets, Inc. (In re Allied Supermarkets,
Inc.), 6 Bankr. 968, 980-81 (E.D. Mich. 1980) (withdrawal from multi-employer bar-
gaining unit).
76. Act ofJuly 10, 1984 Pub. L. No. 98-353, Title III, § 541(a), 98 Stat. 330-90
(11 U.S.C.A. § 1113 (Supp. 1985)).
77. 11 U.S.C.A. § 1113(a). The statute states:
The debtor in possession, or the trustee if one has been appointed under
the provisions of this chapter, other than a trustee in a case covered by sub-
chapter IV of this chapter and by title I of the Railway Labor Act, may as-
sume or reject a collective bargaining agreement only in accordance with
the provisions of this section.
Id.
78. Id. § 11 13(b)(l). The statute provides that after filing a petition in bank-
ruptcy the debtor may begin negotiations to modify its collective bargaining
agreement.
79. Id. The negotiations begin "prior to filing application seeking rejection of a
collective bargaining agreement." Id.
80. Id. § 11 13(b)(l)(A). The statute provides that the debtor shall:
(A) make a proposal to the authorized representative of the employees cov-
ered by such agreement, based on the most complete and reliable informa-
tion available at the time of such proposal, which provides for those
necessary modifications in the employees benefits and protections that are
necessary to permit the reorganization of the debtor and assures that all
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ganization may be proposed.81 The statute does not state what
changes are necessary, and the legislative history provides little in-
sight.82 In addition, the modified contract must ensure that all inter-
ested parties are treated fairly.83
The proposal should be based on reliable information available to
the debtor.S4 There are no criteria as to what type of information
the debtor may consider.85 It is assumed that most of the informa-
tion would pertain to the financial status of the debtor. In order to
promote fair, well-reasoned negotiations, the debtor must provide
the union representative with this information.86 The debtor, how-
ever, is protected from disclosing information that would injure its
status with competitors.87 The statute provides that a court order
may be issued governing the disclosure of the information.88
Once the proposal is made to the union representative, negotia-
tions must continue until impasse is reached.89 The statute provides
that the two sides must meet at "reasonable times"9o and bargain in
81. Id.
82. See generally 130 CONG. REC. S6181-201 (daily ed. May 22, 1984). Senator
Packwood, in presenting his amendment, stresses that only those changes that are
necessary to successful reorganization should be made. Senator Packwood's original
proposal also contained the word "minimum" in referring to the modifications. Id.
The requirement of minimum changes was dropped from the adopted amendment.
Compare 130 CONG. REC. § 6181 with 130 CONG. REC. H4788 (daily ed. June 29,
1984).
83. 11 U.S.C.A. § 1113(b)(1)(A); see supra note 80.
84. Id.
85. Section 1113, however, requires both parties to bargain in good faith. Id.
§§ 1131(b)(2), (c)(2).
86. 11 U.S.C.A. § 11 13(b)(l)(B). The debtor-in-possession must "provide, sub-
ject to subsection (d)(3), the representative of the employees with such relevant in-
formation as is necessary to evaluate the proposal." Id.
87. Id. § 11 13(d)(3). To protect information that might cause the debtor's com-
petitors to have an unfair advantage, the statute provides:
(3) The court may enter such protective order, consistent with the need of
the authorized representative of the employee to evaluate the trustee's pro-
posal and the application for rejection, as may be necessary to prevent dis-
closure of information provided to such representative where such
disclosure could compromise the position of the debtor with respect to its
competitors in the industry in which it is engaged.
Id.
88. Id.
89. See id. § 11 13(c)(2). The statute does not specifically require negotiation un-
til impasse. The statute states that rejection will not be permitted unless the unions
refused the proposal of the debtor. Id.; see supra note 57.
90. 11 U.S.C.A. § 11 13(b)(2). The statute specifically provides:
(2) During the period beginning on the date of the making of a proposal
provided for in paragraph (1) and ending on the date of the hearing pro-
vided for in subsection (d)(l), the trustee shall meet, at reasonable times,
with the authorized representative to confer in good faith in attempting to
reach mutually satisfactory modifications of such agreement.
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good faith.91 If, however, negotiations fail to create an acceptable
contract, the debtor-in-possession may file an application for rejec-
tion with the bankruptcy court.9 2 The application may only be ap-
proved if the court finds that the union representative has refused,
without good cause, to accept the offer.93
The statute provides time limitations on the hearing procedures
once the application has been filed. The bankruptcy court has two
weeks to hold a hearing on the debtor's application for rejection.94
The hearing is open to all interested parties.95 Interested parties
must receive at least ten day's notice of the hearing.96 In special cir-
cumstances the court may extend the hearing date another week97 or
longer if the trustee and union representative agree. 98
To ensure that a decision is made promptly, the court is given
thirty days to rule on the application. 99 Again, the time may be ex-
tended if the debtor and employee representative agree. 10 0 If the
court fails to rule within the prescribed time period, the trustee may
91. Id.
92. Id. § 11 13(c)(l)-(3). The court may only approve rejection if the following
conditions are met:
(1) the trustee has, prior to the hearing, made a proposal that fulfills the
requirements of subsection (b)(1); (2) the authorized representative of the
employees had refused to accept such proposal withut good cause; and (3)
the balance of the equities clearly favors rejection of such agreement.
Id.
93. Id.
94. Id. § 11 13(d)(l). The statute places definite time constraints on the court:
(d)(l) Upon the filing of an application for rejection the court shall sched-
ule a hearing to be held not later than fourteen days after the date of the
filing of such application. All interested parties may appear and be heard at
such hearing. Adequate notice shall be provided to such parties at least ten
days before the date of such hearing. The court may extend the time for the
commencement of such hearing for a period not exceeding seven days
where the circumstances of the case, and the interests ofjustice require such







99. Id. § 11 13(d)(2). The decision must be rapidly made.
The court shall rule on such application for rejection within thirty days after
the date of the commencement of the hearing. In the interests ofjustice, the
court may extend such time for ruling for such additional period as the
trustee and the employees' representative may agree to. If the court does
not rule on such application within thirty days after the date of the com-
mencement of the hearing, or within such additional time as the trustee and
the employees' representative may agree to, the trustee may terminate or
alter any provisions of the collective bargaining agreement pending the rul-
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terminate or alter the provisions of the contract pending the court's
decision.]OI The presumption is that the contract will remain in
force until the rejection is approved or the thirty day period expires.
In emergency situations, the statute provides for modification
without negotiation. If the court determines that the reorganization
will fail before negotiations can be completed or that the estate will
suffer "irreparable damage," the court may approve unilateral
changes.10 2 Court approval may be granted, however, only after no-
tice and hearing.103 This ostensibly prevents the contract from be-
ing terminated without union participation in the process.
B. Standard for Rejection
Section 1113, in addition to procedural requirements, sets forth
standards for the bankruptcy court to follow. The statute requires
three findings before the court is allowed to approve the application
for rejection. The standard is similar to the one articulated by the
Supreme Court. 10 4 It does, however, provide more protection for
the employees than did Bildisco.
First, the debtor must show the bankruptcy court that its proposal
meets the requirements of section (b)(1) of the statute.' 0 5 The
debtor must show that the proposal made only necessary modifica-
tions in employee benefits and protections.106 The debtor must also
show that these modifications were necessary to successful reorgani-
zation.107 Finally, the debtor must show that the information used in
designing the modifications was provided to the union
representative.108
Second, the court must find that the union representative refused
the proposal without good cause.' 09 The statute does not define
101. Id.
102. Id. § 1113(e). The statute also incorporates the test set forth in REA Express,
523 F.2d 164, 169, when the debtor is in danger of facing liquidation. See supra note
41.
If during a period when the collective bargaining agreement continues
in effect, and if essential to the continuation of the debtor's business, or in
order to avoid irreparable damage to the estate, the court, after notice and
a hearing, may authorize the trustee to implement interim changes in the
terms, conditions, wages, benefits, or work rules provided by a collective
bargaining agreement. Any hearing under this paragraph shall be sched-
uled in accordance with the needs of the trustee. The implementation of
such interim changes shall not render the application for rejection moot.
11 U.S.C.A. § 1113(e).
103. 11 U.S.C.A. § 1113(e).
104. 104 S. Ct. at 1197.
105. 11 U.S.C.A. § II 13(c)(l); see supra note 93.
106. 11 U.S.C.A. § 11 13(b)(l)(A); see supra note 84.
107. 11 U.S.C.A. § 1113(b)(l)(A).
108. Id. § 11 13(b)(1)(B); see supra note 87.
109. 11 U.S.C.A. § 11 13(c)(2); see supra note 90.
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good cause. The legislative history, however, indicated that this sec-
tion should be narrowly interpreted.I 10 The union representative
should base its decision largely on the information presented by the
debtor in negotiations. I
Finally, section 1113 adopts the standard articulated by the
Supreme Court in Bildisco. 112 The bankruptcy court must find that
"the balance of the equities clearly favors rejection of such agree-
ment." 113 The only change from the Bildisco standard is the addition
of the word "clearly."' 14 In all probability, this will not change the
burden of proof.' 15
III. SECTION 1113: A LABOR-MANAGEMENT COMPROMISE
An initial reading of section 1113 leads to the conclusion that Con-
gress significantly changed the law set out in Bildisco. A more careful
analysis reveals that the statute incorporates the holding of Bildisco
into NLRA procedures. Congress provided the protections offered
by labor laws while recognizing the importance of a successful
reorganization.
A. Negotiation of the Contract Modifications
Both the NLRA and Bildisco recognize the importance of negotia-
110. See H.R. Rep. No. 5174, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. § 54 1(a), 130 CONG. REC.
H7488, H7495 (daily ed. June 29, 1984). Representative Lungren stated that the
committee believed that good cause "should be interpreted narrowly by a reviewing
court; it certainly was not intended to permit virtually any refusal on the part of the
labor representative." Id.
White, The Bildisco Case and the Congressional Response, 30 WAYNE L. REV. 1169,
1198 (1984). The practical application of the "good cause" standard has been ques-
tioned. Professor White poses a number of situations that could possibly be seen as
rejecting good cause. He states.
Presumably this requires that the court not only make its own determination
whether the management proposal was fair and equitable, but also whether
the union decision was itselfjustified on factors that may be unrelated to the
merits of the modification proposal. By what standard is the court to mea-
sure these things? Is the unions' refusal "with good cause" if nonunionized
workers of competing business are accepting terms similar to those offered?
Are all refusals "for good cause" if the management proposal was too
niggardly?
Id.
111. H.R. Rep. No. 5174, supra note 110, at H7495. The union representative
should not be allowed to base its refusal on the contracts of other unions in the area.
Id.
112. Bildisco, 104 S. Ct. at 1197 (application of the balancing of the equities
standard).
113. 11 U.S.C.A. § 1113(c)(3).
114. See id.
115. See White, supra note 110 at 1198. Professor White states that the standards
do not really make any difference because "courts will continue routinely to reject
collective bargaining agreements." Id.
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tion of a labor contract. Section 8(d) of the NLRA outlines a lengthy
negotiation process before either party may terminate or modify a
collective bargaining agreement.' 16 Similarly, the Supreme Court
stated that a debtor must show that it negotiated the issue of rejec-
tion with its employees.' 17 Section 1113 compromises between the
detail of the NLRA and the vague requirement of Bildisco.
The statute also incorporates the good faith bargaining require-
ments of the NLRA and Bildisco. The NLRA imposes a duty to bar-
gain in good faith whenever there is a labor dispute.118 A change in
the employment contract is a labor dispute,' 19 and therefore, must
be bargained. The Bildisco decision also imposes a duty to bargain in
116. 29 U.S.C. § 158(d); see supra note 63.
117. 104 S. Ct. at 1201. The Court stated that a debtor is "obligated to bargain
collectively with the employees' certified representative over the terms of a new con-
tract pending rejection of the existing contract or following formal approval of rejec-
tion by the Bankruptcy Court." Id.
See Yorke, 709 F.2d at 1143 (trustee held to same duty as employer to bargain in
good faith); Kevin Steel, 519 F.2d at 706 (debtor cannot ignore its obligations under
NLRA); Bachelder, 120 F.2d at 576 (refusal to bargain is within jurisdiction of NLRB).
While Yorke involved the duty of a trustee to bargain in good faith, it applies
equally to a debtor-in-possession. The court "believe[d] that recognizing a duty to
bargain would not unduly impede the Trustee's discharge of his responsibilities."
Yorke, 709 F.2d at 1143. Section 503(b)(1)(A) of the Bankruptcy Code provides that
the trustee takes responsibility for "the actual, necessary costs and expenses of pre-
serving the estate, including wages, salaries, or commissions for services rendered
after the commencement of the case." Id. The court further reasoned that because
the duty to bargain arose from a decision to close operations for the creditors' bene-
fit, all costs could be administrative costs to "preserve the estate" for the benefit of
creditors. Id.
118. 29 U.S.C. § 158(d). Subsection (a) of § 158(d) defines a "labor dispute" as
the following:
(c) The term 'labor dispute' includes any controversy concerning terms or
conditions of employment, or concerning the association or representation
of persons in negotiating, fixing, maintaining, changing, or seeking to ar-
range terms or conditions of employment, regardless of whether or not the
disputants stand in the proximate relation of employer and employee.
Id.
119. There has been no comprehensive definition of "terms or conditions of em-
ployment" offered by the courts. The findings regarding this issue have been made
on an ad hoc basis. See, e.g., Fibreboard Paper Prods. Corp. v. NLRB, 379 U.S. 203
(1964) (subcontracting of work is a term or condition of employment); Order of R.R.
Tel. v. Chicago & N.W. Ry. Co., 362 U.S. 330 (1960) (merger of smaller railway lines
is a term or condition of employment); Sinclair Refining Co. v. Atkinson, 370 U.S.
195 (1962) (work assignments are terms or conditions of employment).
State legislatures have attempted to define the term. One example is the defini-
tion found in section 179.03 of Minnesota Statutes. "Terms and conditions of em-
ployment means the hours of employment, the compensation therefor including
fringe benefits except retirement contributions or benefits, and the employers' per-
sonnel policies affecting the working conditions of the employees." MINN. STAT.
§ 179.03, subd. 19 (1984).
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good faith.120 Section 1113 explicity enforces this duty on the
debtor-in-possession. 121
The good faith requirement is indirectly applied to the union rep-
resentative. If the union representative does not bargain in good
faith, it would be incumbent on the court to find that the contract
proposal was refused "without good cause."122 Once the court
makes this finding, the contract will most likely be rejected.123
Therefore, while the statute does not explicitly impose a duty to bar-
gain in good faith, it is in the best interests of the employees to do
SO.
B. Time Restrictions on Effective Termination
Section 1113 allows for modification of the contract in a relatively
rapid manner. Under the NLRA, the contract could be terminated
no earlier than sixty days after the proposal is made.124 Bankruptcy
procedures accelerate the process.' 2 5 If the debtor and the union
representative can agree to modifications, the new contract takes ef-
fect as soon as court approval is received.126 The hearing must be
within fourteen days of application.127 Court approval must follow
within thirty days after the hearing.128 If the debtor and union rep-
resentative cannot agree, the debtor applies to the court to reject the
contract.' 2 The same time limitations apply whether the debtor is
seeking to assume or reject the contract. Therefore, the changes
would be in effect, no more than forty-four days from the date of
120. A finding of good faith in the debtor's rejection is of paramount importance.
Almost any business can show that it would be better off without a union contract.
See 104 S. Ct. at 1199. Justice Rehnquist's Bildisco mandate of reasonable efforts to
negotiate does not explicitly require a showing of good faith. The lower courts have
consistently held that a good faith showing is essential in a decision to permit rejec-
tion. See, e.g., Brada Miller, 702 F.2d at 899 (good or bad faith of both parties ex-
amined); Kevin Steel, 519 F.2d at 707 (improper motivation may preclude rejection).
Perhaps, a reasonable effort is one that is made in good faith.
The balancing of the equities must be determined from the facts and circum-
stances of each case. A comprehensive list of factors would be impossible, but the
Supreme Court's relative silence on the subject has made the task of the bankruptcy
court unduly burdensome.
121. 11 U.S.C.A. § 11 13(b)(2).
122. Id. § 11 13(c)(2). See White, supra note I 1l, at 1197.
123. See II U.S.C.A. § 1113.
124. 29 U.S.C.A. § 158(d).
125. See 11 U.S.C.A. § 1113(b).
126. See id.
127. See id. § 11 13(d)(2). The court has the discretion to extend the time period if
the trustee and representative agree. For statutory language, see supra note 99.
128. See I I U.S.C.A. § 1113(d)(1); see supra note 94.
129. See I 1 U.S.C.A. § 11 13(c)(2). The court may approve the rejection only if the
debtor can show that "the authorized representative of the employees has refused to
accept such proposal .... ." Id.
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application to the court.130
The Bildisco Court placed no time restrictions on the debtor. In
fact, the Court's holding implies that the contract could be rejected
whenever the debtor decided.131 Section 1113 specifically reversed
this part of the holding.132 Congress was aware, however, that even
the abbreviated statutory procedures may be detrimental to a strug-
gling debtor. 133
In order to protect the interests of the debtor, section 1113 pro-
vides emergency procedures. The bankruptcy court may approve
unilateral termination if it is "essential to the continuation of the
debtor's business," or if the estate will suffer irreparable damage. 134
To protect the unions, the statute requires notice and hearing before
approval of unilateral changes.135 Congress has, through these vari-
ous standards, incorporated most of the case law on rejection of col-
130. See id. § 11 13(d)(1)-(2).
131. See 104 S. Ct. at 1199-1200. This is the most objectionable aspect of the
Bildisco decision. The holding not only goes against the NLRA but also the Bank-
ruptcy Code.
Section 8(d) of the NLRA requires that a party who wishes to modify or termi-
nate a collective bargaining agreement must give notice to the other party of its pro-
posed changes. 29 U.S.C. § 158(d)(1); see, e.g., First Nat'l Maintenance Corp. v.
NLRB, 452 U.S. 666 (1981); Fibreboard Paper Prods. Corp. v. NLRB, 379 U.S. 203
(1964); Mastro Plastics Corp. v. NLRB, 350 U.S. 270 (1956). But see Pulliam, supra
note 37, at 3-5 (section 8(d) should be narrowly construed).
Both sides must meet to discuss the changes proposed. See 29 U.S.C.A.
§ 158(a)(5). This requirement is consistent with the general requirement to agree to
bargain collectively with the employees' representative. Id. The Federal Mediation
and Conciliation Service must be notified. Id. § 158(d)(3). Finally, the existing con-
tract remains in force for 60 days or until the current contract expires. Id.
§ 158(d)(4).
The Supreme Court required that the debtor negotiate before seeking rejection.
Bildisco, 104 S. Ct. at 1196. The only additional burden on the debtor would be noti-
fication of the federal agency and maintenance of the contract. In some cases, the 60
day waiting period required by 29 U.S.C. § 158(d)(4) would be long enough to im-
pair the reorganization process. If the contract were that unduly burdensome, how-
ever, the debtor should not have a problem convincing a bankruptcy court that the
contract should be rejected.
Furthermore, the holding in Bildisco is contrary to generally accepted bankruptcy
procedures. Section 365(a) provides that the debtor may not reject or assume an
executory contract without the court's express approval. 11 U.S.C. § 365(a). No au-
thority states that an exception should be made for executory labor contracts.
132. 11 U.S.C.A. § 1113(f). This subsection is a preemption section. "No provi-
sion of this title shall be construed to permit a trustee to unilaterally terminate or
alter any provisions of a collectible bargaining agreement prior to compliance with
the provisions of this section." Id.
133. See 130 CONG. REc. S8893 (daily ed. June 29, 1984).
134. 104 S. Ct. at 1197. Virtually any debtor could demonstrate that a union con-
tract may cause irreparable damage. See id. at 1199.
135. 11 U.S.C.A. § 1113(e).
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lective bargaining agreements.136
C. The Modification Proposal. Factors to be Considered
The statutory presumption is that the debtor will attempt to mod-
ify before attempting to reject the collective bargaining agree-
ment.13 7 The only modifications that can be made are those that are
"necessary."' 38 To protect all creditors, commercial and service, the
modifications must treat all affected parties fairly and equitably.t39
The difficulty in determining whether all parties are treated equitably
and fairly is deciding what type of information the debtor is permit-
ted to examine when proposing modifications. Congress failed to
address this issue directly. The legislative history indicates that Con-
gress considered financial reports to be most important.140 This ig-
nores, however, the unique aspects of the employee's contract. 141
The cost saved by rejection is only part of the consideration. 142 Had
Congress addressed this issue more fully, the task of the bankruptcy
court would be clearer.
Absent specific Congressional direction, the courts must turn to
case law for guidance.t43 Bildisco, while offering little protection to
the employees, stated that "the Bankruptcy Court must not only con-
sider the degree of hardship faced by each party, but it must also
consider any qualitative differences between the types of hardship
each may face."' 144 Some courts have considered the ability of the
debtor to reduce costs elsewhere,145 or the costs of competitors' la-
bor contracts. 146 At the very least, bankruptcy courts should keep in
mind the unique nature of the labor contract in determining if modi-
fications are necessary.
D. The Standard of Rejection: Judicial Interpretation
One of the major problems in instituting the Bildisco standard is
136. See supra notes 40-42 and accompanying text.
137. See 11 U.S.C.A. § 1113.
138. Id. § 1113(b)(l)(A).
139. Id.
140. 130 CONG. REc. H7495 (daily ed. June 29, 1984).
141. See Bildisco, 104 S. Ct. at 1195. The Court discusses the standard of rejection
for collective bargaining agreements. The Court concludes that because of the "spe-
cial nature" of collective bargaining agreements the standard of rejection of such
contracts is different from other executory contracts.
142. See id. at 1197.
143. See White, supra note 109, at 1198. Professor White states that "[olnly after
many cases have made their way through the federal court system will we know what
modifications are 'fair and equitable' ..... ld.
144. Bildisco, 104 S. Ct. at 1197.
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the vagueness of the standard. The Court merely stated that if the
equities balanced in favor of rejection, the court should approve.147
Little guidance was provided as to what factors a bankruptcy court
should examine in balancing the equities.148 Section 1113 provides
no further guidance.
Since Congress adopted the vague standard set forth in Bildisco,
interpretation of section 1113 is left to the courts. The leading case
interpreting section 1113 is In re American Provision Co. 149 In American
Provision, the Minnesota Bankruptcy Court identified nine require-
ments in the statute that must be met before an application to reject
may be approved.i50
147. Bildisco, 104 S. Ct. at 1196-97. In Bildisco, the Supreme Court did little better
than the lower courts in articulating a standard for the rejection of collective bargain-
ing agreements. The Court offered no measurable facts to be weighed in balancing
the equities. See id. at 1197.
148. Id. at 1197. The balancing of equities test is too vague a standard to develop
any precise tests. The Court, however, outlined certain factors for the bankruptcy
courts to consider. First, the likelihood of liquidation absent rejection should be ex-
amined. Id. This is a change from the REA Express standard that liquidation must be
certain if the debtor is not allowed to reject. Second, other creditors must be consid-
ered. See id. at 1195 (citing REA Express, 523 F.2d at 167-69). If assumption of the
contract would reduce the estate so that other claims are jeopardized, rejection
would be justifiable. Finally, the impact on the employees themselves must be ex-
amined. Id. In summary, the Court stated that the "Bankruptcy Court must consider
not only the degree of hardship faced by each party, but also any qualitative differ-
ences between the types of hardship each may face." Id. at 1197.
Although the Supreme Court did not address the factors to be considered in
balancing the equities, other courts have. See, e.g., Bildisco, 682 F.2d at 79-80 n.12.
The court could compare the amount of labor costs to the gross revenues of the
debtor. See In re Briggs Transp. Co., 39 Bankr. 343, 351 (D. Minn. 1984). In Briggs,
the debtor's labor costs were 70% of gross revenues. Id. The court found that a
70% figure was high enough to impede reorganization. In making this determina-
tion, the court looked to the industry standard of 56% to 60%. Id.
The debtor may be able to reduce costs in other areas before it becomes neces-
sary to tamper with the labor contract. See id. at 345; see also Reserve Roofing, 21 Bankr.
96. In Reserve Roofing, the debtor's collective bargaining agreement was rejected be-
cause it put the debtor at a disadvantage with its competitors. In contrast to the non-
union companies, Reserve Roofing was required under the collective bargaining
agreement to make pension payments. The additional payments placed the debtor in
an inferior position with respect to his competitors. Id. at 97-99.
149. 44 Bankr. 907 (Bankr. D. Minn. 1984).
150. Id. at 909. The statute does not list the requirements separately as did the
court:
1. The debtor in possession must make a proposal to the Union to modify
the collective bargaining agreement.
2. The proposal must be based on the most complete and reliable informa-
tion available at the time of the proposal.
3. The proposed modifications must be necessary to permit the reorgani-
zation of the debtor.
4. The proposed modification must assure that all creditors, the debtor
and all of the affected parties are treated fairly and equitably.
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In addition to discussing these requirements, the American Provision
court addressed the burden of proof issue. The court stated that
Congress failed to allocate the burden of proof to either the debtor
or the union representative.151 Since the statute imposes duties on
the debtor, the court reasoned that the debtor has the burden of
proving that the requirements were met.]'5 The court found, how-
ever, that the burden of production of evidence shifts to the union
on three of the requirements.153 Once the debtor has made a prima
facie case, the union must demonstrate that it was not provided with
adequate information, that the debtor did not bargain in good faith,
and that its refusal to accept the modification was with good
cause. 154
The American Provision court then addressed the factors used by the
debtor in making its proposal. The debtor compared the cost and
benefits of non union wages to the cost of the union contract. 1 55
The debtor also compared the cost of wages to total operation
costs. 1 56 In examining the financial data, the court held that the
5. The debtor must provide to the Union such relevant information as is
necessary to evaluate the proposal.
6. Between the time of the making of the proposal and the time of the
hearing on approval of the rejection of the existing collective bargaining
agreement, the debtor must meet at reasonable times with the Union.
7. At the meetings the debtor must confer in good faith in attempting to
reach mutually satisfactory modifications of the collective bargaining
agreement.
8. The Union must have refused to accept the proposal without good
cause.
9. The balance of the equities must clearly favor rejection of the collective
bargaining agreement.
Id.
151. Id. at 909.
152. Id. The court stated that "since these nine requirements form the bases of
the debtor's motion, the debtor bears the burden of persuasion by the preponder-
ance of the evidence." Id.; see also In re Salt Creek Freightways, 47 Bankr. 835, 838
(Bankr. D. Wyo. 1985) (citing American Provision, 44 Bankr. 907).
153. American Provision, 44 Bankr. at 909. The court found that the "burden of
going forward with the evidence" should not always be on the debtor. Id.
154. Id. at 909-10. The court stated:
In particular, as to elements 5, 7 and 8, I think that to a certain extent
the burden of production of evidence should lie with the Union. As to ele-
ment 5, I think that it is incumbent upon the debtor in the first instance to
show what information it has provided to the Union. It is then incumbent
upon the Union to produce evidence that the information provided was not
the relevant information which was necessary for it to evaluate the proposal.
Likewise as to element 7, once the debtor has shown that it has met with the
Union representatives, it is incumbent upon the Union to produce evidence
that the debtor did not confer in good faith. And lastly as to element 8,
once the debtor has shown that the Union has refused to accept its proposal
the Union must produce evidence that it was not without good cause.
Id.
155. Id. at 910.
156. Id. The debtor showed that salaries were approximately $24,000.00 a month.
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changes proposed did not meet the statutory standard.157 The
debtor did not show that the changes were necessary for successful
reorganization. 1
5 8
There have been relatively few reported decisions interpreting sec-
tion 1113.159 American Provision is the first to address the issue and
has set the tone for other bankruptcy courts. 160 In focusing on the
financial data, the court reached an appropriate accommodation of
the employee's and employer's interest.
CONCLUSION
The intention of the 1984 amendment was to establish procedures
and standards for rejection of collective bargaining agreements.
Also, the amendment is intended to prevent debtors from rejecting
those contracts before the bankruptcy court has given permission.
Congress has succeeded in outlining detailed procedures. The pro-
cedures provide full and fair negotiation before a debtor can alter an
existing collective bargaining agreement. Congress, however, has
fallen short in its attempt to provide a meaningful standard for rejec-
tion of these agreements. The "balancing of the equities" standard
adopted in the amendment is the same nebulous standard articulated
in Bildisco. Congress should have articulated factors for the bank-
ruptcy court to use in evaluating rejection of a collective bargaining
agreement. Congress, however, seemed more intent in overruling
Bildisco than in providing guidance to bankruptcy courts. Therefore,
until judicially created factors have been established, both the debtor
and the union will be negotiating without knowledge of which factors
balance the equities in whose favor.
Billie Zippel
Total operating expenses were $58,000.00 a month. Therefore, the cut in wages
would save two per cent of the monthly expenses. Id.
157. See id. at 910-11.
158. Id. The court stated that since the new contract negotiations were due in less
than six months, 22% savings on salaries was not necessary to successful reorganiza-
tion. Since the debtor could wait until the current contract expired, it was not neces-
sary to tamper with the existing agreement. Id.
159. See In re Salt Creek Freightways, 46 Bankr. 347 (Bankr. D. Wyo. 1985).
160. See Salt Creek Freightways, 47 Bankr. at 837.
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